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Predictions about how new information technologies will affect different socio- 
economic classes range from suggestions that class lines will be abolished to 
warnings of  a greater knowledge gap. People see different futures not only 
because they may be looking at different realities, but because they have differ- 
ent ideas about how a variety of  social forces afTect the shape and direction of 
technological development and distribution. Political will, availability and dis- 
tribution of  resources, cultural norms, and legal residue and innovation all 
influence which, how, and how fast technologies will develop, to whom they 
become available, under what constraints, and to whose advantage. 
One factor determining the actual impact of  the new technologies on spe- 
cific classes is information policy. Although information policy as a distinct and 
coherent body exists in few nation-states, in the United States (as elsewhere) a 
corpus of  rules, drawn from constitutional, statutory, common, and regulatory 
law, can be identified that functions as an inforrnation policy and can be ana- 
lyzed as such. 
Two heuristics help us identlfy laws, regulations, and decisions that fall 
within the information policy domain. The notion of  an "information produc- 
tion chainJ'  described by Machlup (5) and Boulding (1) can be adapted and 
used to define the domain as including those policies that apply to any stage of 
a chain that includes inforrnation creation (creation, generation, and collec- 
tion), processing (algorithmic and cognitive), storage, transportation, distribu- 
tion, destruction, and seeking. The all-inclusiveness of  this approach permits 
identification of  information policy irrespective of  body of  law as traditionally 
defined. This approach also permits exclusion of  certain types of  information, 
actors, or processing from some or all steps of  the chain in response to cul- 
tural, aesthetic, religious, or political concerns. 
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The second heuristic is the notion of  latent, as well as manifest, information 
policy. Manifest policy, such as traditional First Amendment law or law of  intel- 
lectual property, directly and explicitly deals with information creation, pro- 
cessing, flows, and use. Latent policy indirectly or implicitly shapes information 
and its flows. Latent policy develops as a side effect of  decisions made in other 
areas, synergistically when policies made in different areas combine with often 
unintended effects, and when information policy is subsumed under other 
labels. Trade law, securities regulation, and zoning decisions are among the 
sources of latent information policy. 
These conceptual tools can be used to identify the information policy of  any 
decision-making arena or governmental unit. The information policy of  the 
United States Supreme Court is of particular interest at this historical conjunc- 
ture. 
First, though there are a number of different ways of  defining information, 
the broadest and most significant treat information as a constitutive force in 
society (2). From this perspective, which should provide the first and final anal- 
yses during the policy-making process, decisions about information policy are 
decisions about the way society will be structured-how  socioeconomic classes 
will be formed and how people can act within and between them. Thus, the 
decisions of  the Supreme Court, the governmental institution assigned the task 
of  making judgments in light of  their constitutive impact on society, are of par- 
ticular interest in the iriformation policy realm. 
Second, during the formative phase of  a policy-making process, constitu- 
tional bases for policy making are of  particular importance. Identification of 
information policy as a distinct realm for policy making is recent, and the ana- 
lytical tools are still being developed. Thus there is great need for understand- 
ing of constitutional principles and modes of  thinking. 
U.S. Supreme Court information policy decisions of  the 1980s were exam- 
ined here for their impact on the relationship between information and socio- 
economic class. By  the 1980s, a su£Iiciently  high level of technological change 
had permeated society for a long enough period of  time to permit new types of 
problems to rise to the Supreme Court level. The decade also saw the begin- 
nings of  a shift in the nature of  the Supreme Court into its fourth historical 
period of  relative conservatism. While it is true that changes in the makeup of 
the Court-and  in the minds of justices who continue to sit-mean  one can 
never predict the outcome of  future cases, certain trends are nonetheless 
clearly identifiable. 
An examination of  these decisions reveals a constitutional information policy 
that has the effect  of producing and reproducing socioeconomic class lines by 
(a) acknowledging the relationship between informational class and socioeco- 
nomic class, (b) upholding labor-management lines developed to reify a spe- 
cific type of industrial organization, (c) assigning differential informational 
rights and responsibilities by profession, and (d) distinguishing among the 
informational rights available to different economic groups. The Information Gap/ Information and Socioeconomic Class 
The Supreme Court is explicitly aware of the relationship between 
sodoeconomic and informational class and has addressed it directly in 
several cases.  Some of these cases dealt with access to training in the crea- 
tion, processing, storage, and use of information-that  is, with education. In 
other cases, the Court explored problems of  people who are informationally or 
socioeconomically disadvantaged. 
Brennan articulated the Court's general philosophy in Plyler v. Doe  (457 U.S. 
202 [1981]), in which it was declared unconstitutional to deny children of  ille- 
gal aliens access to the free Texas public educational system: 
[Elducation has a fundamental role in maintaining the fabric  of our society. 
We cannot ignore the signgcant social costs borne by our Nation when select 
groups are denied the means to absorb the values and skills upon which our 
social order rests. .. . . Illiteracy is an enduring disabilig. me  inability to read 
and write will handicap the individual deprived of a basic education each 
and every day of his lif. The inestimable toll of that deprivation on the social, 
economic, intellectual, andpsychological well-being of  the individual, and the 
obstacle itposes to individual achievement, make it most dzficult to reconcile 
the cost or the principle of a status-based denial of  basic education with the 
pamework  of  equality embodied in the Equal Protection Clause (pp. 221-222). 
Brennan directly questions the value of creating and perpetuating a "subclass 
of  illiterates," as do Powell in a concurrence and Burger in a dissent. Denial of 
the right to education is understood to be particularly unfair in this case 
because it would result from (in Breman's biblical terms) visiting the sins of 
the parents upon the children. 
The Court here widens the notion of  cost from the short-term efficiency con- 
cerns of  the school system to the long-term cost concerns of society. On the 
one hand, it is argued, the savings that would result from excluding those chil- 
dren had not been demonstrated to have a significant educational benefit. On 
the other hand, the cost to society of  a subclass of  illiterates is demonstrably 
high in terms of crime, unemployment, etc. Brennan notes that concern for 
protecting resources is not sufficient  to justify the use of  a particular classifica- 
tion system for allocating those resources. 
Brennan stops just short of calling education a fundamental right, but Black- 
mun, in a concurrence, equates it with the right to vote. Blackmun does, how- 
ever, question the ability of  the judiciary to adequately assess the effects of 
complex social policies, while Burger dissents because he feels that the Court 
does not have jurisdiction to address the problem of  illegal immigration. Mar- 
shall, in a concurrence, reinforces the link between education and basic consti- 
tutional values. 
Although in Plyler the Court would not permit a line to be drawn between 
children of  illegal aliens and others, in Martinezv. Bynum (461 U.S. 321 
[1982]) the Court was willing to exclude Mexican children living with relatives 
in Texas from the state's free public schools. The Court, through Powell, this Journal of  Communicationy  Summer 1989 
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time accepted the school system's argument that a residence requirement is 
justified in order to protect system efficiency. Provision of primary and second- 
ary education is again stressed as one of  the most important functions of local 
government. Marshall notes in dissent, however, that the relationship between 
exclusion of students and system efficiency again had not been proven. 
The Court has been ambivalent about whether institutions should be able to 
use handicapped status to draw class lines. In one education case, the Court 
was willing to support some specialized services, though not all those 
requested. In another case, however, it supported the decision of the Federal 
Communications Commission not to require signing for the deaf on publicly 
funded television. 
The decision in Board of Education, Hendrick Hudson Central School Dis- 
trict~.  Rowley (458 U.S. 176 [1981]) came in response to a request by parents 
of  a deaf'child to trade some elements of her specialized educational program 
for a sign-language interpreter. The student in this case was able to catch less 
than half of what was said in the classroom under her present program  , 
(though, even so, she consistently achieved above-average grades). In terms 
that will penetrate other discussions of access, Rehnquist's opinion noted the 
complexities of defining equal access under the Education of the Handicapped 
Act: 
[F]urnishing handicapped children with only such services as are available to 
non-handicapped children would in all probability fall short of the statutory 
requirement of  'pee  appropriate public education'; to require, on the other 
hand, the furnishing of  every special service necessary to maximke each hand- 
icapped cbild'spotential is, we think, further  than Congress intended to go. 
Thus to qeak in term  of  "equal"services in one instance gives less than what 
is required by the Act and in another instance.  more. The theme of the Act is 
'pee  appropriate public education, "  a phrase which is too complex to be cap- 
tured by  the word  "equal" whether one b  speaking of opportunities or ser- 
vices. . .  . The right of access to  pee public education. .  .b  significantly dzferent 
porn any notion of  absolute equality of opportunity regardless of  capacity (pp. 
198-199). 
Rehnquist specifically mentions that the amount of financial resources spent 
per child does not have to be equal. 
The Court in Rowley ultimately defined a basic floor of  opportunity that 
included access to specialized instruction and related services individually 
designed to provide educational benefit to the child; operationalization of the 
standard was left to the states, and parents were assigned the role of protecting 
children from state and local decisions. White's dissent in this case accused 
Rehnquist and the Coua of  backing down from constitutional policy-making 
responsibilities. In his eyes, the Court is competent to decide that a child who 
is hearing less than half of what is said does not have equal access to the class- 
room. 
In another decision dealing with the handicapped, the Court upheld the 
FCC's decision that public television stations do not need to be accessible to Tbe Information Gap/Information and Socioeconomic Class 
the deaf, despite requirements of  the Rehabilitation Act of  1973. Pressed by a 
citizens' group that sought denial of  a license renewal because signing was not 
offered, in Community Television of  Southern California v. Gotifried (459 U.S. 
498 [1982]) the Court denied the importance of  the Rehabilitation Act  as infor- 
mation policy and accepted the FCC's exclusion of the deaf from participation 
in public television. 
Burger's opinion in Bethelv. Fraer (478 U.S. -  ,  92 L.  Ed.2d 529 [1986]), 
a case dealing with punishment for sexual speech in a high school, addressed 
the school function of ensuring that every individual finds a place within the 
social order. The school is described as a direct instrument of  the state; the 
objective of  public education is to inculcate the fundamental values required 
for maintaining a democratic system. Expelling a student for serial innuendoes 
in a student assembly speech is justified because behavior as well as curricu- 
lum is to "teach by example the shared values of  a civilized social order" 
(Bethel, p. 448). 
The Court also addressed problems generated by today's  underclass. In Boag 
v. MacDougall(454 U.S. 364 [1980]), a District Court had rejected as frivolous a 
prisoner's complaint about solitary confinement because the complaint was 
illiterate. In a per curium (brief and unanimous) decision the Supreme Court 
reversed the District Court, insisting that unartful pleadings must be construed 
liberally. The Court focused on ensuring that lack of skill in information crea- 
tion does not hamper an individual's efforts to articulate his or her rights 
within the legal system or to receive appropriate protections. 
Atkinsv. Parker (472 U.S.  115 [1984]) involved the question of whether 
notice of a change in the Food Stamp Act-with  consequences that vary in sig- 
nificant detail from person to person-must  be individualized. It was argued Journal of  Communication, Summer 1989 
that only with specific data can people know how to plan their household bud- 
gets. Such information is also required in order to decide whether to appeal 
the agency's decision to change the amount assigned; in this case, the agency 
knew that miscalculations had been made for a large class of  recipients. The 
Court held that individualized notice was not required because, in Stevens's 
words, "The entire structure of  our democratic government rests on the prem- 
ise that the individual citizen is capable of  informing himself about the particu- 
lar policies that affect his destiny" (p. 131). 
Marshall's dissent evolved from the fact that most unsophisticated recipients 
were unable to translate the general notice into terms meaningful to them- 
selves. Brennan argued that logic, history, and function require individualized 
information about a change in food stamp laws. His dissent points to what may 
be a key area of  information policy in the future: the relationship between sta- 
tutory entitlements-the  "new" property interests of  the underclass-and  infor- 
mation issues. Since statutory property rights like food stamps or Medicaid exist 
only to the degree determined under law, questions about decision-rnaking 
techniques and mandated information flows affect the creation and protection 
of  these new types of  property rights. 
In sum, the Court is sensitive to the relationship between information and 
socioeconomic class. It is in general opposed to the idea of  using information 
policy decisions to create socioeconomic class lines and tries to diminish the 
impact for today's  subclass. The arguments offered stress the value to both the 
individual and to society, emphasizing harmonization of  society as a goal. 
The fact that efficiency is so often used as a counterargument points to the 
importance of  how a system itself is defined. Something that is inefficient in the 
short term for a local system (such as a school) may be efficient in the long 
term for the broader system of  society in general. Disagreements in this area 
are often simply over where to draw the system boundaries. The value of  har- 
monization of  the social system seems at this point to dominate over notions of 
civil liberties or social'equity. 
Despite a general position to the contrary, in speci6c areas, such as 
labor relations, the Court is willing to uphold class stratifications. In 
Ellk v. Brotherhood of Railway, Airline & Stearnsb@ Clerks (466 U.S. 435 
[1983]), the Court made explicit its understanding that labor laws abridge First 
Amendment rights. In United Steelworkers of America v.  Sadlowski (457 U.S. 
102 [1981]), it made clear that speech rights granted union members are not 
coextensive with First Amendment rights. 
In National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) v. Hendricks County Rural Elec- 
tric Membership Corp. (454 U.S.  170 [1980]), class membership was actually 
determined by the type of  information to which an employee had access. The 
Court held that it was legitimate to keep employees with a labor nexus, i.e., 
access to management information concerning labor matters, out of  the bar- 
gaining unit. Employees with access to other confidential information, such as 
that regarding sales contracts or government relations, however, must be per- 
mitted to enter the union. The Information Gap/Information and Socioeconomic Class 
Brennan's opinion emphasizes that it was precisely to control information 
flows at the corporate decision-malung level that the labor/management line 
was drawn in the first place; he suggests that this is a service for labor as well 
as management. At issue in this case was whether class lines should be drawn 
by function (access to confidential information) or by role ("secretary" was not 
specifically mentioned in the law). The Court felt that the informational func- 
tion was more important than role in determining legal status. Powell, how- 
ever, felt that the Court still went too far by permitting some employees with 
access to confidential information into the bargaining unit. Explaining his view 
of  congressional intent, he describes in detail how a secretary could pass criti- 
cal information to union members during a strike. 
Decision making internal to a union was at issue in two cases. Business 
agents fired by a new union president (Finnegan v. Leu, 456 U.S. 431 [1981]) 
and union members who didn't want dues spent on non-union political activi- 
ties (Ellis v.  roth her hood) complained that their First Amendment rights had 
been abridged. The Court in both cases upheld the right of  union management 
to make its own decisions, justifying this position-as  well as their intrusion 
into internal union decision making in general-as  necessary to protect union 
democracy. 
Non-union workers' access to decision-making processes of  the government 
as an employer was the issue in Minnesota State Board  for Community Col- 
leges v. Knight (465 U.S. 271 [1983]). Non-union members of  the state college 
faculty claimed a right to have their views heard by government officials who 
made policy affecting the college, a right denied by the Court in O'Connor's 
quite clear language: "Appellees have no constitutional right to force the gov- 
ernment to listen to their views. They have no such right as members of  the 
public, as government employees, or as instructors in an institution of  higher 
education" (p. 283). In this opinion O'Connor also explicitly denies constitu- 
tional status for academic freedom. 
Marshall's concurrence in this case suggests a more subtle approach, deter- 
mining the authority of  a decision-maker to choose information sources accord- 
ing to the nature of  the decision at issue and the institutional environment in 
which it must be made. Stevens dissents because he feels that it is unaccepta- 
ble to make the union the only authorized spokesperson for all employees on 
political as well as contractual matters. He is outraged that the Court should 
suggest a state interest in fostering any private monopoly on information flows. 
Union members were favored over non-union members in a different way in 
United Brotherhood of  Carpenters C Joiners of  America v.  Scott (463 U.S. 825 
[1982]). Here, non-union workers who were beaten and had their work 
destroyed by union members alleged a conspiracy to deprive workers of  their 
First Amendment rights of  association. The Court chose to interpret conspiracy 
law as narrowly as possible and found no First Amendment violation because 
there was no state action. 
A law against permitting non-union members to influence union elections 
through financial support beyond a specified limit was upheld in United Steel- 
workers of  America v.  Sadlowski. Again, the Court relied on the notion of  pro- Journal of  Communication, Summer 2989 
tecting union democracy. White dissented, emphasizing that to restrict funds 
spent on speech is to restrict speech itself. 
In National Association for  the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) v. 
Claiborne Hardware Co. (458 U.S. 886 [1981]), the Court came down on the 
side of  a union boycott, even though some members of  the group involved 
engaged in behavior not protected by law. Stevens's opinion noted that speech 
does not lose its protection just because it encourages others to act; nor do the 
actions of  some cause an entire group to lose protection for their speech activi- 
ties. In two cases, International Longshoremen 3 Association, ML  -CIO v. Allied 
International (456 U.S. 212 [1981]) and DeBartolo Colp. v.  NLRB (463 U.S. 147 
[1982]), the Court refused to protect picketing of  companies related to the tar- 
get (secondary picketing), based on distinctions among stages of  production. 
In the area of  labor relations, then, the Court is quite willing to use informa- 
tion policy decisions to reinforce socioeconomic divisions, even using access to 
information itself as a demarker of  class lines. Union members in general are 
favored over non-union, and union management over rank and file. We  are 
reminded of  the tenuousness of  academic freedom. 
The Court acknowledges that the free speech rights of  unions are not coex- 
tensive with those of  the First Amendment, for unions are not facets of  the state 
in the sense required for state action under the First Amendment. What is more 
interesting, however, are the arguments made by the government for intruding 
into nongovernmental speech activities in the first place. During a time when 
greater amounts of  a wider variety of types of power are being ceded from the 
public to the private sector, the question of  information policy internal to orga- 
nizations such as unions (or corporations), as well as the "foreign policy" of 
organizations as they interact across institutional boundaries, becomes of key 
importance. 
The Court also linked socioeconomic and informational class by deh- 
ing informational,rights, limits, and responsibilities according to 
profession. During the period under study, the Court ruled on the informa- 
tional practices of  attorneys, physicians, law enforcement professionals, stock 
market tippees, and investment  counselor^.^ 
FBIv. Abramson (456 U.S. 615 [1981]) explored the informational rights and 
responsibilities of  law enforcement officials as it unraveled a Freedom of Infor- 
mation Act  (FOIA) case dealing with work papers. At  stake were investigatory 
records that had been subsequently incorporated into records compiled for 
other purposes, and the question was whether an FOLA  exemption still applied 
once the information had been processed again. The Court said yes: Once 
information has been processed for law enforcement purposes, it is always pro- 
tected, regardless of  subsequent further processing, transportation, or exchange. 
Blackmun, dissenting, is uncomfortable with the trend toward treating informa- 
tion differently for legal purposes depending on its source and argues that 
'Journalistic practices have been explored by the judiciary in the past  (3, 4). Tbe Information Gap /  Information and Socioeconomic Class 
information shouldn't have to be "parsed" for its sources in order to determine 
legal treatment. 
In a rare unanimous opinion, US v. Arthur ?oung (465 U.S.  805 [1983]), the 
Court stressed the importance of  information collection-and  therefore 
accountants-to  the functioning of  the tax system as a whole. In this case, a 
corporation tried to withhold documents from the Internal Revenue Service 
(IRS) by calling them work products. Accountants here were distinguished 
from attorneys in terms of  the nature of  their public service. Accountants are 
responsible to the entire sociecy; thus, the public interest demands that com- 
munications between accountants and those whom they are auditing be acces- 
sible to governmental inspection. Attorneys, on the other hand, are understood 
to serve private clients, not the public, making privileged communications 
between attorney and client acceptable. 
Federal Trade Commission (E;TC) v.  Grolier (462 U.S. 19 [1982]) specifically 
explored the question of  whether the status of  protection of  attorneysJ  work 
products changes with the stage of  the litigation process. The Court held such 
papers to be protected irrespective of  the status of the litigation for which the 
information had been prepared. There was concern that without such protec- 
tion, much of what is now written down while preparing a case would no 
longer be recorded for fear of  disclosing working methods to current or poten- 
tial opponents. 
The Court concluded in Upoh  v.  US  (449 U.S.  383 [1980]) that the work 
products doctrine also applies to attorneys working within the corporate con- 
text. Thus, attorneys' questionnaires to corporate employees regarding bribes to 
foreign governments were protected from collection by the IRS. The Court 
stressed the need to be able to predict when one will have privileged cornrnu- 
nication. 
In In re RMJ  (455 U.S.  191 [1981]), the Court held unconstitutional a lower 
court ruling that listed categories of  information and language which attorneys 
were forbidden to use in advertising. Although these specifics were rejected, 
Powell's opinion drew attention to the assumption underlying controls on attor- 
ney advertising: it is easier to deceive people when information is complex, 
sophisticated, and unfamiliar. There was also fear that uncontrolled advertising 
would be degrading to the profession. 
Limits on the informational activities of  physicians were also discussed dur- 
ing this period. In Akron v. Akron Center  for Reproductive Health (462 U.S. 
416 [1982]), a municipal ordinance that delineated just what and how informa- 
tion about abortions was to be transmitted by doctors to patients was held to be 
unconstitutional by a Court that believed such regulation intruded on the 
professionalism of  physicians. In this case, the information specified went 
against previous Court thinking by espousing one specific theory of when 
human life begins. It was feared that the persuasive effect of the information, 
combined with the time and money required to conduct such conversations, 
might reduce the number of those choosing abortions. 
The Court did support, however, compelling a physician to notify the parents 
of  a minor who seeks an abortion in H.L. v. Matheson (450 U.S.  398 [1980]). Journal of Communication, Summer 1989 
Burger here distinguished between knowledge and decision-making  power, 
stating for the Court the view that informing the minor's parents confers the 
former but not the latter. 
The informational rights and responsibilities of  the "profession" of tippee in 
the stock market were explored in two cases during this period that defined a 
specific role for tippees in the "harmonized marketplace" often mentioned by 
the Court as an ultimate goal. In Dirks V. Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) (463 U.S. 646 [1982]), the Court found no breach of  SEC rules when a 
tippee broker passed on fraudulent information to clients before the public. 
The Court based its argument on the fact that the tippee's duty derives from 
that of  the insider and is inherited with the transfer of  information. Without an 
insider, reasoned the Court, there is no tippee responsibility under SEC rules. 
In Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner (472 U.S. 299 [1984]), an 
insider provided false and incomplete information that was then passed on by a 
tippee. When sued by the tippee for fraud, the insider claimed that the tippee 
shared culpability. The Court found that the culpability of the two parties dif- 
fered, with the tippee not as culpable as the tipper whose breach of  duty gave 
rise to the tippee's liability in the first place. Brennan's opinion for the Court 
argues that denying the defense of  shared responsibility best protects the 
investing public and promotes the national economy by allowing defrauded 
tippees to bring suit against defrauding insiders, deterring insider trading. He 
also notes that the inpari delicto ("at equal fault") defense is no good when 
there is an inequality of  information. 
The profession of  investment advisor is distinguished from that of  publisher 
in Lowev. SEC (472 U.S. 181 [1984]). Stevens argues for the Court that the 
danger of  fraud and deception is higher in personalized communications than 
in publications sold on the open market. Providing factual information about 
past transactions and market trends, and publishing newsletters on general mar- 
ket conditions, are protected as press activities. 
Again, the nature of  the service to the public is the criterion. Publishers 
serve the public interest by passing along information of value to the masses in 
an anonymous relationship; investment advisers develop person-to-person fidu- 
ciary relationships characterized by individualized advice. White's concurrence, 
however, notes that Congress does not have an untrammeled right to restrict 
speech by defining fiduciary relationships. 
Definition of the informational rights and limits of  various professions is 
based on two notions. First, the criterion used for determining those rights and 
limits is the nature of  the relationship between professional and client and, in 
turn, between the client or "client" population and the general public; are they 
one and the same, overlapping, or in opposition? These features appear to 
define the public interest for the Court. 
Second, there is a sense that all types of information are not equal in the 
eyes of  the public in'terms of  ability to deceive. Cases discussed earlier, such 
as Atkins v. Parker, as well as those touched on here, refer to three sources of 
variance. There can be differences in the motivations and abilities of the sender 
of  the message, in the level of  difficulty or complexity of  the message itself, or The Information Gap /  Information and  Socioeconomic Class 
in the ability of the receiver to handle the message on several levels. The regu- 
latory consequence is to regulate more tightly those professions, such as law, 
that are thought to handle the more difficult, and therefore potentially decep- 
tive, information. 
Another consequence of  constraints and protections on information activities 
of various professions is the establishment of property rights in information 
resources and the value added through processing. The tippee's rights over the 
property of information are increased as his or her liability for fraudulent infor- 
mation received from an insider decreases, for example, and police ownership 
of information processed for their purposes continues even when that informa- 
tion is reprocessed for other purposes. 
In cases exploring the economics of information processing, the Court 
has treated differently media  available at different levels of the sodo- 
economic scale, limited some expenditures,  and moved  toward  the  posi- 
tion that information services and resources should be available only 
for a fee. Some time was spent by the Court exploring the general relationship 
between money and speech. In Citizens against Rent ControI/Coalition  fw 
Fair Housing v.  Berkeley (454 U.S.  290 [1980]), a municipal ordinance prohibit- 
ing political associations from accepting over $250 per contribution was found 
unconstitutional. Here Burger stressed the importance of  association in amplify- 
ing speech, ensuring that through collective effort people can make their 
voices heard when individually they might be lost. 
Blackmun's concurrence distinguishes the ability of funds to corrupt in the 
electing of  a representative and in voting on ballot measures, where the people 
themselves render the ultimate political decision. Dissenting, White suggests 
that individuals find different types of  speech activities interchangeable. Thus, 
assuming a user will easily and happily turn from one medium to another, for 
White denial of access to a particular medium is of  no great concern. 
The issue of limits on spending for speech was poignantly distilled in Wal- 
tersv. National Association of Radiation Survivors (473 U.S. 305 [1984]). This 
case was brought by an organization of veterans who were victims of atomic 
bomb testing and of  the use of Agent Orange in Vietnam. In seeking help from 
the government in coping with the effects of  their service-induced  injuries, 
individual veterans had found their attempts limited by a Civil War  statute 
restricting to $10 the amount that a veteran can pay an attorney for representa- 
tion when petitioning the government. (The fee was the Civil War equivalent 
of  $580 in today's market.) This, claimed veterans of  the 1980s, was an abridg- 
ment of  First Amendment rights, since it was impossible to find adequate rep- 
resentation for such a fee. 
The Court, through Rehnquist, here deferred to Congress and, stressing the 
age of  the law, upheld it. Stevens, in disgust, dissented bitterly and starkly: 
"The Court does not appreciate the value of  individual liberty" (p. 358). He 
points out that the right to have legal help when petitioning the government 
has never before been questioned and rejects the Court's reliance on adminis- 
trative arguments. Stevens notes that the importance of  adequate representation Journal of  Communication, Summer 1389 
in dealing with the Veterans' Administration had been made vivid by evidence 
that showed routine examples of  cases denied because of  poor preparation. In 
his eyes, this matter is not trivial: "If  the Government, in the guise of a pater- 
nalistic interest in protecting the citizen from his own improvidence, can deny 
him access to independent counsel of  his choice, it can change the character 
of  our free society" (p. 370). 
Cost barriers to access to the national information distribution system were at 
issue in US. Postal Service v.  Greenburgh Civic Association (453 U.S. 114 
[1980]). The ,association  sought the right to use the mails without paying access 
fees (that is, buying stamps). Their First Amendment argument was that their 
small budget should not prevent them from being able to use the postal sys- 
tem. Rehnquist's opinion denying that claim was based on the historical rela- 
tionship between the postal service and sovereignty itself, saying, "Government 
without communication is impossible" (p. 121). Administrative arguments such 
as protecting mail revenues and facilitating efficient and secure delivery of 
mails were accepted, with an emphasis on the quid pro quo: when privately 
owned mailboxes become a part of the nationwide system, their owners agree 
to abide by system rules; in exchange, owners receive not only the services 
provided by the post office, but also the protection of the mails. 
White's concurrence saw the postal system as a public forum, but one whose 
use can be legitimately restricted to those who will pay the fee. For Brennan, 
the issue is free speech. His concurrence firmly upholds the importance of 
access to the mails, quoting Justice Holmes: "[The use of the mails is almost as 
much a part of  free speech as the right to use our tongues" (Holmes in dissent, 
in  US. ex rel. Milwaukee Social Democratic Publishing Company v. Burleson, 
255  U.S. 407 [1921], p. 437). Postal regulations are acceptable, Brennan 
believes, because they are reasonable regulations of  "time, place, and man- 
ner."= 
Marshall dissented, arguing that the point of the Postal Provision of  the Con- 
stitution was to place "the powers of  the Federal Government behind a 
national communication service" (p. 142). While acknowledging the need to 
protect the economic viability of that service, he claims that the regulation in 
this case is inconsistent with that purpose. More important, he notes that the 
decision goes against the Court's previous stance that efficiency and economy 
must yield before speech as a value. He points to the District Court determina- 
tion that 
only by placing their circulars in the letterboxes may appellees be certain that 
their messages will be secure porn wind, rain, or snow, and at the same time 
"Time, place, and manner" regulation of First Amendment activities is permitted when there are no 
alternative regulatory mechanisms available, the regulation is drawn as narrowly as possible, and 
there are alternative channels of communication left open. Thus, for example, it is an acceptable 
time, place, and manner regulation that forbids making loud noise in a hospital zone, since alternative 
venues for speech are left open and there is no other way to serve the legitimate social goal of aiding 
the sick. The Information Gap/Information and Socioeconomic Class 
will  alert the attention of  the residents without nohwng would-be burglars that 
no one has returned home to remove items  from  doorways or stoops.  The court 
concluded that the costs and delays of mail service put the mails out of a~el- 
lees' reach, and that other alternatives such asplacing their circulars in door- 
ways are "much less saafactory "  (p. 144). 
Marshall also distinguished the Postal Service from other public forums such as 
mass transportation because the'very purpose of  the Postal Service is to facili- 
tate communication. He stressed the right of box owners to receive information 
as part of  their First Amendment rights. And he notes the creeping spread of 
post Office "property''  rights: 
----  ------------ 
-  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  - 
I remain troubled by the Court's efort to transform the letterboxes entirely into 
components of  the governmental enterprise despite their private ownershzg. 
Under the Court's reasoning, the Postal Service could decline to deliver mail 
unless the reczlpients agreed to open their doors to the letter carrier-and  then 
the doorway, or even the room inside could fall  within Postal Service control 
(p. 151). 
Stevens's dissent also supports a right to receive information. On another 
front, he challenges the assumption that the mails must be a subsidized public 
monopoly and claims that the public interest may be better served by privatiz- 
ing some portions of  the system. He still challenges the dominance of  effi- 
ciency as a value in the decision-making  process: 
Conceivably, the invalidation of  this law would unleash aJow of  communica- 
tion that would sink the mail service in a sea ofpaper. But were that to hap- 
pen, it would merely demonstrate that this law is a much greater impediment 
to the fiee flow  of  communication than is  presently assumed  To the extent that 
the law prevents mailbox clutter, it also impedes the delivery of written mes- 
sages that would otherwise take place  (p. 155). 
The Coua defended subsidized public television in FCCv. League of  ---------  -W&w+v&m  6f@hj%miu f363  EST%?-~!B~  ,Jeclanng unconstitutional 
the Public Broadcast Act rule against editorializing by public stations. There 
was strong dissent in this case, however. Rehnquist argued that the government 
has the right to decide where it will spend its money and need not do so to 
support particular political positions or candidates through public television 
editorials. Stevens dissented from a radically different perspective. Recalling 
Hitler's use of radio, Stevens fears government propaganda and suggests that 
the dserence between legislators and judges on this point may come from 
where they sit: 
Members of  Congress, not members of  theJudiciary, live in the world ofpoli- 
tics. When they conclude that there is a real danger ofpolitical considerations 
incfluencing the dipensing of  this money and that this provision is necessary to 
insulate grantees from political pressures in addition to the other safeguar& 
thatjudgment is entitled to our respect (p. 416). Journal of Communication, Summer 1989 
Restrictions  on  low-cost forms of speech  were the subject of  several 
other cases. Clark v.  Community  for  Creative Non-  Violence (468 U.S.  288 
[1983]) dealt with the cheapest form of  speech of  all-sleep,  available even to 
the homeless who wanted to demonstrate by sleeping in a park across from the 
White House. The group claimed abridgment of  their First Amendment rights 
when they were denied a Park Service sleeping permit, arguing that without it 
the size and duration of  the demonstration would decrease. (Many of  the 
homeless were not as likely to participate without a place to sleep or without 
hot food.) The Coua upheld the permit denial as a reasonable restriction of 
time, place, and manner, since other elements of  the demonstration had been 
left in place, including a symbolic city, signs, and a day-night vigil; the group 
was not denied access to the media or to the public for their intended mes- 
sage. 
Marshall dissented because he believes that the argument of  efficiency again 
used here is not appropriate as a governing principle in information policy 
matters. He claims that its use leads to constitutionally insensitive decisions; his 
suspicions come from experience with problems that he believes are endemic 
to bureaucracies: 
What the Court fails  to recognize is thatpublic oficiab have strong incentives 
to over-regulate even in the absence of an intent to censorparticular views. 
This incentive stemsfiom the fact  that of the two groups whose interests oficials 
must accommodate-on  the one hand, the interests of the general public and, 
on the other, the interests of those who seek to use a particular forum for First 
Amendment activity-the  political power of the former is likely to be far 
greater than that of the latter. . . . 
[GJovernment  agencies by their very nature are driven to over-regulate  pub- 
lic forums  to the detriment of First Amendment rzghts (pp. 315-316). 
Marshall argues emphatically that content neutrality does not necessarily mean 
that the weight of  a regulation will fall equally upon members of  all classes: 
A content-neutral regulation that restricts an inexpensive mode of communi- 
cation will fall  most heavily upon relatively poor speakers and the points of 
view that such speakers typically espouse. This sort of htent inequality is veery 
much in evidence in this case for  respondents lack the financial means neces- 
sary to buy access to more conventional modes ofpersuasion. 
A disquieting feature about the diposition of this case is  that it lends cre- 
dence to the charge that  judicial administration of  the First Amendment, in 
conjunction with a social order marked by large disparities in wealth and 
other sources ofpower, tends systematically to discriminate against e$om  by 
the relatively disadvantaged to convey their political ideas (pp. 31  3-3 14, n. 
14). 
Billboards, another relatively low-cost mass medium, were at issue in Metro- 
media v. San Diego (453 U .S. 490 [1981]).  A city ordinance discriminating 
between billboards that advertised goods and services sold where they were 
being advertised, and those sold off-site, permitting the former and prohibiting The Information Gap/Information and Socioeconomic Clm 
the latter, was  declared an unconstitutional content distinction on its face. 
Although the city claimed trac  safety and aesthetic concerns, several justices 
in this case emphasized what they saw as the unique characteristics of  bill- 
boards. Brennan's concurrence in particular stressed their importance for cer- 
tain purposes and speakers because of  their relative inexpensiveness. 
Los Angeles v. Tazpayers  for  Vincent (466 U.S. 788 [1983]) discussed other 
inexpensive media-handbills  and signs on public property, such as utility 
poles. The Court upheld the constitutionality of  a municipal ordinance that 
restricted their use on aesthetic grounds, though both Blackrnun and Brennan 
specifically rejected this argument because they saw no evidence of  a compre- 
hensive aesthetic prom  Althoughit isackmBd.w&% tkAe4sierrwiU - 
reduce the total amount of  communication in the city and prohibits people 
from communicating in a certain manner, Stevens defends the Court's position: 
A dzj'trz'butor of leafle6 has no right simply to scatter h&pamphle& in the air- 
or to toss large quantities ofpaperflorn the window of  a tall building or a low 
JZying  airplane. Characterizing such an activity as a separate means of  com- 
munication does not diminish the State's  power to condemn it us a public nui- 
sance (p. 809). 
Further, while government property such as lampposts may be used for signs, 
"the mere fact that government property can be used as a vehicle for communi- 
cation does not mean that the Constitution requires such uses to be permitted" 
(p. 814). 
Brennan, dissenting again, defended the use of  inexpensive media such as 
signs as distinct and critically important, particularly for the "little people." He 
stressed many of  the characteristics that also contribute to the attraction of bill- 
boards as a distinct medium: 
Use of this medium of  communication is particularly valuable in part because 
it entails a relatively small expense in reaching a wide audience, allowsflex- 
bility in accommodating various  formalts, typographies, and graphics, and con-  -  its message*+  ~~&~  mad aa#un&~~moX @ Z  72adeT 
or viewer. There may be alternative channek of communication, but theprev- 
alence of  a large number of signs in Los Angeles b  a strong indication that,  for 
many speakers, those alternatives are far  less satx$actory  (p. 819). 
Clearly, the Court understands that access to funds greatly facilitates the exer- 
cise of  First Amendment rights, including the right to petition the government 
and the right to association, as well as speech and press rights. In USPS v. 
Greenburgh Association, as well as  in other cases, the Court begins to restrict 
information goods and services to those who can pay, raising a cost barrier to 
access. 
Media available to those at the bottom of  the socioeconomic scale are the 
least protected. Thus, the cycle of the mutually reinforcing link between socio- 
economic and informational class is completed: socioeconomic deprivation 
directly translates into an informational handicap that has, in turn,  a potential 
socioeconomic consequence. Journal of  Communication, Summer 1989 
Harmonization-of  the social system, of the marketplace-has  come to 
replace the free flow of information as the metaphor that dominates 
Court thinking. It appears in discussions about matters as far-ranging as edu- 
cation and the stock market. Even explorations of  the nature of  the public 
interest responsibilities of  various professions hinge on an at least implied 
notion of  how each profession fits into a harmonized marketplace or society. 
Efficiency, as a result, has risen to the top of  the value hierarchy used to 
justify  Supreme Court decisions. The appropriateness of  cost-benefit analysis in 
constitutional decision making has been questioned elsewhere in Court deci- 
sions. Constitutional scholar Lawrence Tribe (6)  opposes using any type of 
mathematical calculation as the basis for decision-making in the constitutional 
realm, where, he claims, one should not be just allocating resources among 
existing categories in a predetermined manner but rather redefining the cate- 
gories themselves and relationships within and among them. 
In the cases discussed here, various justices argued the pros and cons of  effi- 
ciency as a constitutional value, and decisions came down on both sides. It is 
clear, however, that the impact of  "efficient"  (bureaucratic) administration of 
justice  is felt most heavily by those who are already the most disadvantaged. 
Content neutrality is another regulatory technique that has come to be ques- 
tioned. 
The Court has displayed a tendency often found in public opinion on First 
Amendment matters: it will stand on principle when principle is cast in general 
terms, but will change position when faced with a specific question. Thus, 
while in general the Court opposes the production or reproduction of  socio- 
economic class lines through its information policy decisions, in particular 
instances it is quite willing to uphold the constitutionality of  a system that 
blocks information flow fiom non-union members to their government employ- 
ers. It is willing to subject its own soldiers-largely  from the lower socioeco- 
nomic ranks-to  nuclear fallout and Agent Orange, and then deny them the 
right to hire the necessary representation to petition the government for help 
in coping with their injuries. 
In general, the Court does support socioeconomic class divisions through its 
information policy decisions by providing relatively few protections for media 
available to those at the bottom of  the socioeconomic scale, directly limiting 
spending in some cases, deferring to labor law, and defining informational 
rights and responsibilities by profession. The Court also brings to our attention 
ways in which information policy decisions actually create or destroy property 
rights. 
Information policy stands between the development of  new information 
technologies and their actual impact on various classes. Future decision making 
could be guided by more comprehensive thinking and research about the 
effects of  existing policy as well as exploration of  the normative issues 
involved. 
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Cable TV  for the Deaf 
Newcomers to the Gallaudet campus soon notice the number of TVs  mounted in 
many areas where people gather-the  cafeteria, the snack bar, and building lob- 
bies. Instead of the piped-in music so  common to public buildings, at Gallaudet there 
is  something visual going on. 
The  Department of TV,  Film, and Photography operates a %-channel cable televi- 
sion system reaching classrooms, offices, and dorms across the Gallaudet campus. 
The  system provides instructional, institutional, and entertainment programs for the 
Gallaudet community. 
Several channels are devoted to various categories of  instructional programming, 
including three separate sign language channels. Other channels are used to broad- 
cast instructional films requested by teachers for classroom purposes. Also available is 
a channel featuring full-time religious programming selected by the Office of Cam- 
pus Ministries. 
The  system carries all local Washington- and Baltimore-area broadcast television 
stations. Network programs are presented with open captions, eliminating the need 
for decoders with television sets on campus. 
Another channel presents original Gallaudet productions and captioned versions of 
programs of special interest to the campus community. The  programs Include "Deaf 
Mosaic," "The President's Forum,"  special convocations and events, and sports cov- 
erage. Certain activities are presented live with real-time captions for those who 
cannot attend in person. Recently a number of informational programs about AIDS 
and substance abuse were captioned and broadcast. 
Three full-time cable operators provide dubbing and playback services and pre- 
pare a monthly cable program guide. 
Reprinted from Gallaudet Today 18(4),  1988. 